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The violence that erupted in the West Bankand Gaza Strip at the end of September 2000came as no surprise to many observers.
Warnings of trouble ahead had been issued repeat-
edly by many commentators. The path-breaking
Israeli-Palestinian parliamentarian Azmi Bishara
had warned once again in June that the “maximum
Israel is prepared to compromise won’t reach the
minimum expectations of the Palestinians. I do not
think it is either war or peace, but there is a con-
frontation coming.” Even Yasir Arafat begged the
Americans not to go forward with the Camp David
summit in July because the parties were not yet
ready to strike a final deal. If the summit failed, he
argued, instability would almost certainly follow.
His pleas fell on the deaf ears of an American team
that was overly anxious to cut a final peace deal in
the last days of Bill Clinton’s presidency.
Yet even with these warnings, rarely has such a
major foreign policy issue been so poorly under-
stood and reported in the American media as has
this recent outbreak of violence. The crisis largely
has been reported as “Arafat’s war” (to use New York
Times columnist Thomas Friedman’s provocative
phrase), a deliberate war launched by the Palestini-
ans against Israeli peacemakers. In this way of
thinking, when decision time came for the Pales-
tinians at Camp David—the historic opportunity to
accept a generous Israeli offer and end the con-
flict—Arafat balked, still more comfortable playing
the role of guerrilla leader than statesman. Accord-
ing to Friedman, Arafat then returned home and
ignited the war that would happily prevent him
from ever having to make the hard choice for peace.
Besides showing a breathtaking ignorance of his-
tory and Palestinian politics, this argument contains
within it what I call the “microwave” theory of
political violence: Arafat can push a button and
immediately create a rush of frenzied energy, and
then push another button to immediately stop it.
The notion of Palestinians-as-automatons would
rightly be dismissed as ludicrous, perhaps even
racist, if applied to nearly any other people. It is an
equally absurd path to comprehending the tragic
turn of events in Palestine. How should we under-
stand the recent violence?
GROWING DISCONTENT
Palestinian anger in September could be seen at
three different levels. First, long-simmering discon-
tent with the Oslo peace process had been growing.
Seven years after the famous 1993 handshake on the
White House lawn between Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Authority (PA) Presi-
dent Yasir Arafat, most Palestinians have seen few
tangible benefits of “peace.” After all those years and
so many agreements (Oslo I, Gaza-Jericho, Oslo II,
Hebron, Wye), Palestinians still controlled only 13.1
percent of the West Bank and none of East Jerusalem.
For the benefit of 400 Jewish settlers living in down-
town Hebron, 20,000 Palestinians in nearby neigh-
borhoods were kept under a constant and harsh
military occupation. For the benefit of 5,000 Jewish
settlers, Israel still controlled one-third of the Gaza
Strip—at the expense of the more than 1 million
Palestinians living there.
Settlement expansion and new construction have
continued every year since the Declaration of Prin-
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“Had Arafat accepted Israel’s offer at Camp David, the violence in recent
months would have been more in the form of a Palestinian civil war. Or as
Arafat reportedly asked Clinton when the American president was pushing
hard for him to accept Barak’s offer: ‘Do you want to attend my funeral?’”
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ciples was signed in 1993. New settlements have
been built in the West Bank and Gaza under both
Labor and Likud party governments in Israel. Not
only is the transfer of civilian populations to occu-
pied territory explicitly forbidden by international
law, the transfers also violate Oslo’s prohibition
against undertaking unilateral acts that would prej-
udice the final status negotiations. Even though
Ehud Barak was elected Israel’s prime minister in
1999 on a clear peace platform, the rate of settle-
ment building increased 51 percent under his gov-
ernment. Today, some 200,000 Jewish settlers live in
nearly 200 settlements in the West Bank and Gaza
(an additional 130,000 Jewish Israelis also reside in
East Jerusalem). Not one settler or settlement has
been removed in seven years of the “peace process.”
Thus, for most Palestinians, seven years of peace
had not significantly changed the daily reality of liv-








outside specific urban areas had to be undertaken
with Israeli permission—which was often denied.
Access to Jerusalem and its holy places was forbid-
den to about 95 percent of the Palestinian popula-
tion. Only for a Palestinian who never left his or her
home city could life under military occupation be
said to have ended. Indeed, the arguments advanced
by Oslo’s early opponents were seen to be coming
true: this peace process was not leading to a real
peace, but to a restructured occupation enforced not
by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) but, ironically, by
Arafat and the Palestinian police. By the early sum-
mer of 2000, Arafat’s approval rating among Pales-
tinians had dropped to 31 percent, a startling decline
in popularity for “Mr. Palestine.” Was he really the
president of Palestine or merely Israel’s chief of police
in the West Bank and Gaza?
The Camp David summit in July created a sec-
ond level of discontent for Palestinians. Surveys
over the past seven years had shown two, perhaps
contradictory, findings. First, Palestinians over-
whelmingly supported peace with Israel, a finding
that did not vary significantly with the vagaries of
the peace process. However, the surveys also
showed that Palestinians were perhaps naïve or
even myopic about what the Oslo process would
accomplish: despite the cautions given by numer-
ous opposition figures and intellectuals, most Pales-
tinians believed that peace would lead to the
removal of illegal Israeli settlements, a recognition
of the right of return for millions of Palestinian
refugees (and the actual return of many to what is
now Israel), and a complete withdrawal by Israel to
the 1967 borders, as called for in UN Security Coun-
cil resolutions 242 and 338.
The Camp David summit showed clearly that the
peace envisioned by Palestinians was not the peace
Israel was prepared to offer. In the wake of Camp
David’s failure, both sides offered starkly contrast-
ing descriptions of what had actually transpired in








ton. However, Israel likely was prepared neither to
acknowledge the Palestinian right of return as laid
out in UN resolution 194 (and therefore to accept
responsibility for the expulsion of Palestinians in
1948), nor to accept more than a token return of
Palestinians to Israel—and only under humanitar-
ian, not legal, provisions. Moreover, Israel insisted
on maintaining sovereignty over most of East
Jerusalem, including the Old City. Finally, most
West Bank settlements would be annexed to Israel.
While the failure to reach agreement over
Jerusalem was reported to have been the biggest
stumbling block at Camp David, the proposed
annexation by Israel of about 10 percent of the West
Bank was an equally large problem from the Pales-
tinian perspective.1 Israel’s reported proposal would
have cut the West Bank into three cantons, each
completely surrounded by areas of Israeli control.
Israel would annex the area around the settlements
of Ma’ale Adumim and the Etzion Bloc, extending
Israeli territory from West Jerusalem to the Jordan
River. This would split the West Bank in half. A sec-
ond area of annexation would stretch from the set-
tlement of Ariel in the northern part of the West
Bank all the way to the Jordan, cutting the West
Bank into thirds. Finally, Israel would annex a rib-
bon of land all along the border with Jordan, effec-
16 • CURRENT HISTORY • January 2001
1The figure has been variously reported as annexing from
between 5 percent and 13 percent of the West Bank. Since
no official maps or documents were released by the parties,
the figures vary according to interpretation.
The notion of Palestinians-as-automatons would rightly 
be dismissed as ludicrous, perhaps even racist, 
if applied to nearly any other people.
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tively encircling each of the three cantons.2 For
Palestinians, this proposal to turn the West Bank
into a series of Bantustans was unacceptable, and
could not serve as the basis of a viable state.
After Camp David, no Palestinian could misun-
derstand what Israel’s view of peace entailed—and
it was widely and deeply rejected. Israel was nego-
tiating as though the conflict had begun in 1967,
while the Palestinians were negotiating as though
the conflict had begun in 1948—which, of course,
is historically more accurate. Thus, for Israel,
refugees were not a major issue, and its willingness
to cede about 90 percent of the land taken in 1967
was viewed as extremely generous. From this stand-
point, the Palestinians were highly inflexible in
rejecting Israel’s offer. For the Palestinians, dating
the conflict to 1948 meant that the refugee issue
was central, and also that their concession was the
78 percent of historic Palestine that Israel had
already taken. From the Palestinian perspective, for
Israel to also try to claim part of its gains from the
1967 war was not only greedy, but also in violation
of the terms of reference for the negotiations, that
is, UN resolutions 242 and 338.
The spark that ignited this tinderbox of Pales-
tinian resentment, the third level of discontent, was
Likud party leader Ariel Sharon’s deliberately
provocative visit to a religious site in Jerusalem on
September 28, a place known to Jews as the Temple
Mount and to Muslims as the Noble Sanctuary
(Haram al-Sharif). Bluntly put, in Palestinian histo-
riography, Sharon is an unindicted war criminal. He
has been associated with some of the most horrific
episodes in the Palestinian national tragedy, dating
nearly 50 years. In 1953, as a young officer in the IDF,
Sharon led the infamous Unit 101 in a nighttime
attack on the Palestinian village of Qibya in which
69 civilians were killed, most by having their homes
blown up over their heads. Eighteen years later, Israel
once again called on Sharon to suppress a Palestinian
uprising in Gaza. He did so ruthlessly, killing and
exiling scores of Palestinians. Sharon was the mas-
termind of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon that killed
an estimated 19,000 Arabs, mostly Palestinians, and
included the massacre of hundreds, perhaps thou-
sands, of Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps
of Sabra and Shatilla. The massacre occurred after the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had already
departed Lebanon, leaving the safety of their remain-
ing families in American hands—an obligation the
United States failed to fulfill. Although an official
Israeli investigation found that Sharon bore personal
indirect responsibility for these massacres, his polit-
ical career in Israel blossomed.
Sharon’s September visit to the Temple Mount
occurred just a few days after the observation of the
eighteenth anniversary of the Sabra and Shatilla
massacre. A tireless proponent of settlements and
an opponent of Oslo from the beginning, Sharon
has provocatively established a residence in the
heart of the Muslim quarter of Jerusalem’s Old City.
In short, it would be hard to imagine an Israeli
more hated by Palestinians than Ariel Sharon, and
his visit—designed to politically kill Oslo and Ehud
Barak, and to slow the political return of former
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu within the
Likud ranks—was largely successful from Sharon’s
point of view.
The story of the recent turmoil and violence
should be understood, however, not in terms of per-
sonalities and tactics, but rather in deeper, struc-
tural terms—that of a hegemonic peace.
THE HEGEMONIC PEACE
A hegemonic peace is defined as a peace between
two significantly unequal powers that nevertheless
retain the autonomy to accept or reject the terms of
settlement.3 It is not a peace between relative
equals, nor is it a “peace” completely imposed on
an utterly vanquished enemy. Unlike these last two
types of peace, a hegemonic peace tends to be desta-
bilizing to both the hegemon (in this case Israel)
and to the weaker party (Palestine). The Israeli-
Palestinian peace process is clearly hegemonic in
nature, accurately reflecting the broad (im)balance
of power between Israel and Palestine.
While many hold dear the notion of a “just
peace,” peace treaties invariably reflect power, not
justice. The Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and
agreements over the past seven years are no differ-
ent. On every major issue, Israel’s power has held
sway over Palestine’s justice. All the key issues have
been left for last—at Israel’s insistence. Only at
Camp David, for the first time, were the central
issues of Jerusalem and refugees—among others—
discussed. On each core issue, Israel holds the
power on the ground to decide what to implement.
No refugee can return without Israel’s approval; no
settlement can be dismantled without Israel’s say-
so; no land can be returned to the Palestinians with-
out Israeli consent. The peace process should be
Israel and the Palestinians • 17
2See Ha’aretz, November 14, 2000, and the derivative maps
at <www.infopal.org/palnews/amira2.htm>.
3Some of the discussion in this section draws on Glenn E.
Robinson, “News and Analysis,” Center for Policy Analysis
on Palestine, September 12, 2000.
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understood more as an internal Israeli debate about
how much to concede of all that it controls, rather
than as negotiations between Israel and Palestine.
Most of that internal Israeli debate has centered on
how much of the 22 percent of Palestine not cap-
tured in 1948 should be returned to the Palestini-
ans. Israeli hawks want to maintain permanent
Israeli control over all the Palestinian lands, while
Israeli doves are willing to cede virtually all the
West Bank and Gaza.
The Palestinians have no comparable leverage on
Israel. No illegal Palestinian settlements exist in
Israel; no Israeli refugees pine to return to Gaza; no
Palestinian troops occupy Israeli lands. The only
leverage Palestinians have over Israel is the auton-
omy to reject Israeli proposals. This autonomy is
not inconsequential, because this rejection prevents
Israeli normalization with the Arab world, and it
can create serious instability—as the last few
months have shown. Still, in the final analysis,
Israel controls what happens—or does not hap-
pen—on the ground.
A hegemonic peace tends to be far more unsta-
ble than a peace based on a reasonable balance of
power or on complete domination. Compelling
logic can be offered as to why a hegemonic peace
produces instability for both polities. For the
weaker party, explaining instability is rather obvi-
ous. Considerable opposition to the government
will arise for signing a peace that so obviously com-
promises national rights in the eyes of the popula-
tion. Political opposition at the social level
strengthens, while the “capitulating” government
feels compelled to crack down on dissent. Polariza-
tion occurs that, in simple terms, pits the state
against its own society.
Ironically, a hegemonic peace is destabilizing for
the powerful party as well. Outsiders usually view
such a peace as disproportionately benefiting the
more powerful party. Internally, however, dissent
against the government focuses on the utter lack of
necessity to make any significant concessions. By def-
inition, the powerful party is not compelled by the
weaker party to concede anything. The opposition in
the hegemonic power uses a discourse created in
wartime to assert that any meaningful concessions
are not only unwarranted given the circumstances of
power and (their own constructed) morality, but are
a sign of government weakness and betrayal.
This has been the history of the past seven years
in the West Bank and Gaza. While moments of
exhilaration have occurred, such as during the fall
1995 Israeli withdrawal from some major urban
areas in the West Bank, for the most part the peace
process has failed to realize Palestinian national
rights. Through the years, as the failure of the PLO
to “deliver” in its negotiations with Israel has
become more apparent to more Palestinians, dissent
has increased. In turn, the PA has had to use various
types of repression to ensure containment of the
opposition. The violence during the fall of 2000
temporarily strengthened Palestinian unity, but the
internal contradictions within Palestine eventually
will resurface. The polarization, repression, vio-
lence, and instability born of a hegemonic peace
will only intensify.
Israel too will continue to suffer from instability
brought on by a hegemonic peace process and any
final deal that is eventually cut. While Palestinian
oppositional discourse rejects as unjust the peace
terms, the oppositional discourse in Israel, speak-
ing the language of power, rejects as unnecessary
any significant concessions to a much weaker—and
much hated—party. As with Palestine, this pattern
has been apparent in Israel since the first Oslo
accord was signed in 1993. The large Israeli oppo-
sition has consistently berated Prime Ministers
Rabin, Peres, and Barak for “selling out” Zionism
when no significant external pressure on Israel
compels it to make concessions. Even the rejec-
tionist Netanyahu government was harshly criti-
cized by the opposition in Israel when it signed the
Hebron and Wye River accords.
While the assassination of Rabin in 1995 was the
most obvious example of the instability born of a
hegemonic peace, the sharply vitriolic turn of Israeli
public discourse since Oslo is perhaps a better indi-
cator of the impact of this kind of peace on the
Israeli body politic. As in Palestine, Israelis have ral-
lied around the flag somewhat during the recent
violence, but this will be short-lived.
Compare Israel’s three peace treaties with Arab
countries. Although Israel was clearly more militar-
ily powerful than Egypt, their peace treaty in 1979
was between two strong states that had shown they
could cause considerable damage to one another.
There was a rough parity. That peace, however cold,
has stood the test of time. Few in Israel question its
wisdom. Broadly speaking, a similar statement can
be made for how Israel’s public has greeted the 
Jordan–Israel peace treaty: no significant force in
Israel has denounced the government for making
that peace deal because Israel was compelled to
make no significant concessions (its popular recep-
tion in Jordan, conversely, has been quite hostile).
Only with the Palestinians has peace proved so
18 • CURRENT HISTORY • January 2001
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destabilizing to Israel. Given Israel’s domestic polit-
ical cleavages, no final-status peace deal likely will
change this. In fact, if the past seven years of assas-
sination, recrimination, and vitriolic public discourse
are prologue to Israel’s future, then intense and often
nasty polarization of Israel’s domestic politics pre-
dicted by one of Israel’s more astute scholars will
likely be at hand.4
THE INSIDER–OUTSIDER DIVIDE
While the concept of hegemonic peace provides
the broad parameters within which contemporary
Palestinian politics should be understood, inside
those parameters Palestinian politics has been fluid
since the failure at Camp David. The most signifi-
cant internal Palestinian political cleavage today is
not between the militant Islamic group Hamas and
the PLO (which have temporarily mended their
fences), but between the “insiders” and the “out-
siders.” The Palestinians from the West Bank and
Gaza (the insiders) openly refer to the 100,000 or
so Palestinians who have returned to Palestine since
Oslo as “outsiders.” More precisely, since the PLO
headquarters returned to Palestine from Tunisia, the
PLO returnees are known as the “Tunisians.” The
great irony of the Oslo accord is that it brought to
power in Palestine an outside political elite that did
not lead the revolution—the 1987–1993 intifada,
or uprising—but rather promised to end it. In try-
ing to consolidate their newfound power, Arafat
and the PA undertook to restructure Palestinian pol-
itics toward an authoritarian bent.5
The “Tunisians” dominate the PA bureaucracy in
Palestine. Starting with Yasir Arafat, the Tunisians
hold most of the key PA power positions. While
Arafat has the stature and history to largely protect
him against personal criticism, the same cannot be
said of any other outsider. Outsider domination is
particularly strong in the police and security appa-
ratuses. Indeed, of the 15 or so police and security
services in Palestine (the exact number is unknown
since most are illegal under Oslo), all but two are
dominated by outsiders loyal to Arafat. The two
armed forces in Palestine that can be understood to
be predominately “insider” in their orientations are
Jibril Rajub’s Preventative Security Service (a rec-
ognized arm of the PA in the West Bank), and the
armed militia of Fatah, the Tanzim.
The official Palestinian police and security forces
played only a small role in the recent violence, and
virtually none during the early clashes in October.
The Palestinians doing most of the shooting instead
came from the Tanzim, a ragtag militia made up of
intifada veterans. The Tanzim has no rigid hierar-
chy and is not a disciplined—or even very effec-
tive—military force. However, given the insider
credentials of most of its members, it has a popular
legitimacy on the Palestinian streets unrivaled by
the other repressive and generally hated security
forces. Although Arafat does not control the
Tanzim in a meaningful way, the Tanzim is not
anti-Arafat; rather, it lacks the organizational hier-
archy and discipline to be effectively either
“ordered” to take to the streets or to cease and
desist. Militias by their very nature have too much
individual autonomy for truly effective central con-
trol. And in any case, after Camp David, Arafat had
no compelling political interest to crack down on
the Tanzim; indeed, drawing from the Vietnamese
experience, the Palestinian leadership spoke openly
about pursuing Palestinian rights both at the nego-
tiating table and on the ground through the use of
the “legitimate force” of resistance. Violence in
Israel proper, however, has been explicitly con-
demned by Arafat and the PA.
The voice of the Tanzim has been the secretary
general of Fatah in the West Bank, Marwan al-
Barghouti. Barghouti is young (41), a popular and
charismatic figure among Palestinians, and as much
at home in Palestine’s Legislative Council, where he
is an elected parliamentarian, as he is in confronta-
tions with Israel. A veteran of the intifada, Barghouti
spent years in Israeli jails—institutions that have
“graduated” many of Palestine’s best and brightest.
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4See the conclusion in Ilan Peleg, ed., The Middle East
Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1998).
5For details see Glenn Robinson, “Authoritarianism with a
Palestinian Face,” Current History, January 1998.
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Because of his strong personal loyalty to Arafat,
Barghouti has been able to “push the envelope” on
criticism of the PA. He has been an outspoken voice
for democracy in Palestine and against the corrup-
tion of the PA. Most of the large Fatah movement
also remains loyal to Arafat, in part because of the
privileged position it has been afforded in Palestine.
Fatah cadres represent the most important “insider”
pillar of PA rule. This loyalty, however, does not
translate into automatic support on every issue, and
certainly does not mean total control. Too many fac-
tions and cleavages exist within Fatah today for it
to speak with a unified voice.
Power in Palestine is thus more complex than the
microwave theory allows. The regime has clear social
bases of support even beyond the “Tunisians” and the
Fatah movement, including the landowning notable
families from Palestine’s past and those Palestinians
that benefit from the PA’s large patronage machine.
The PA does not rule by repression alone—far from
it. The failure of Camp David and the subsequent
violence, however, may have caused a fundamental
shift in the ruling coalition in Palestine.
With the exception of Arafat himself, members of
the Oslo elite—the outsiders—have been conspicu-
ous by their political absence since September. Many
have virtually disappeared from the Palestinian pub-
lic scene, including Mahmud Abbas, the presump-
tive successor to Arafat; Ahmad Qurei, the speaker
of the Legislative Council; and Nabil Shath, a cabi-
net minister and the PA’s unofficial representative to
Western donors and businesspeople. While it is still
too early to say for sure, Arafat seems to be shifting
his ruling coalition away from an excessive reliance
on the outsiders to more fully integrate the intifada
elite from the inside, epitomized by Barghouti.
Had Arafat accepted Israel’s offer at Camp David,
the violence in recent months would have been
more in the form of a Palestinian civil war. Or as
Arafat reportedly asked Clinton when the American
president was pushing hard for him to accept Barak’s
offer: “Do you want to attend my funeral?” With the
exception of Arafat, the outsider elite has been dis-
credited by its failure to deliver Palestinian rights
through the Oslo framework. Arafat seems to have
sensed this and is now seeking to rely much more
on insider support—on the hitherto marginalized
intifada elite—for his political survival.
This trend could have far-ranging consequences
if it continues. The intifada elite would be less will-
ing than the “Tunisians” to agree to a deal with Israel
that does not meet basic Palestinian rights. More-
over, as the recent Tanzim activity suggests, they are
also more willing to engage Israel in political vio-
lence to attain those rights than were the Oslo archi-
tects. Conversely, given their more democratic bent
and grassroots popularity, the intifada elite is much
better suited to make any Israeli agreement stick. In
short, this apparent transition would, in the long
run, create a more stable Palestine better able to live
peacefully with Israel. While the logic of hegemonic
peace mitigates against this scenario being realized,
one cannot dismiss the possibility. As social scien-
tist Barrington Moore noted long ago, sometimes
violence is the necessary—if unfortunate—midwife
to a better political future. n
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